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Abstract 
Apparently “there is no substitute for experience”.  This and similar phrases are often heard 
in the worlds of politics, business, sport and others.  It is the sort of proposition that makes 
sense to people.  However, while the performance of actively managed funds has attracted a 
great deal of attention in the past, the performance of managers with long track records has 
attracted relatively little.  In this paper we focus on managers with track records of at least ten 
years, that is, managers that have been the sole manager of a fund for at least a decade.  We 
find that the average, net of fee, risk-adjusted performance of these managers over the ten 
years of our sample is attractive compared to similar values calculated for wider samples of 
the manager population.  However, this result may be a reflection of survivorship bias, since 
we find little evidence of performance persistence from year to year among these managers, 
and evidence to suggest that risk-adjusted performance over the ten year sample period 
declined.  However, for those investors that would still prefer to invest with an experienced 
fund manager, the disaggregated analysis in this paper reveals certain key traits that are 
related to positive risk-adjusted performance of long-serving managers, such as relatively low 
fund fees, more concentrated portfolios and a small cap style bias. 
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 This paper has benefited greatly from the help and advice of Guendalina Bolis and Marcos Aza from Banco 
Inversis and from discussions with members of the International Advisory Board for Fund Selection.  However, 
all opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author. 
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1. Introduction 
The vast majority of papers that have focussed on fund performance have used fund level 
data2.  In other words, they examine the performance of funds rather than the performance of 
fund managers.  But over any sample period more than one manager may have been 
responsible for the management of that fund, particularly as the sample period increases.  
Some researchers have analysed fund performance by augmenting their analysis with fund 
characteristics that are often found to have an impact on risk-adjusted returns.  For example, 
some researchers have looked at: the impact on performance of fund fees (see Elton, et al 
(2003)); the location of the manager relative to the assets being managed (see Shukla and 
Inwegen (1995), or Otten and Bams (2007)); the flows of money into and out of funds (see 
Sirri and Tufano (1998)); and the status of the fund within the fund group, or ‘family’ offered 
by the asset management company (see for example Gaspar et al (2006)). 
 
However, far fewer papers have attempted to understand the relationship between risk-
adjusted performance on the one hand and the characteristics of the manager on the other.  
Arguably the main reason for the relative paucity of such research, relative to the more 
abundant fund level performance analysis, is the availability of a consistent set of data that 
captures manager characteristics relating, for example, to gender and education.  However, a 
growing body of research has attempted to enhance mutual fund performance analysis with 
information about the fund manager – what might be referred to as fund manager level 
research.  Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find evidence to suggest that fund performance is 
positively correlated with manager education and that older managers tended to 
underperform.  Bliss and Potter (2002) find that female managers of both US and 
international equity mutual funds tended to achieve higher raw returns than their male 
                                                          
2
 See Cuthbertson et al (2008) for a survey of the fund management performance literature. 
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colleagues.  Baks (2003) tracks managers as they move between funds, and concludes that the 
fund typically has a greater influence on future performance than the manager.  Atkinson et al 
(2003) find that there is no significant performance difference between male and female 
managers, while Niessen and Ruenzi (2007) find that although female and male managers do 
not differ in average performance, female managers receive significantly lower inflows.   
 
In this paper we also focus on a manager level characteristic that we can refer to as 
experience.  We focus on this characteristic because apparently “there is no substitute for 
experience”.  This and similar phrases are often heard in the worlds of politics, business, 
sport and others.  It is the sort of proposition that makes sense to people, but relatively few 
papers have shone the spotlight on the role of experience as a manager “characteristic”.  
Porter and Trifts (1998) however, focus on the role that experience plays in manager 
performance.  Using Morningstar data spanning the period from 1986 to 1995, the 
researchers examine the performance of 93 “experienced” fund managers, that is, managers 
that had managed the same fund for at least ten years.  Funds that were “team managed” were 
excluded from the analysis.  The mean tenure of this set of fund managers was found to be 
17.4 years.  Using annual fund manager performance rankings the researchers find little 
evidence of performance persistence amongst these managers, including no evidence that 
performance over the first five years of the sample was in any way predictive of performance 
over the last five years of the sample. 
 
Using the sample period from 1986 to 1995 Costa and Porter (2003) examine the 
performance of 112 managers with at least ten years’ experience of managing the same fund.  
To investigate the impact of experience they estimate a factor model of returns for each fund 
in the sample, which includes a zero-one dummy variable that takes the value of one when a 
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manager’s experience is greater than ten years.  The authors find no significant evidence of 
additional alpha from the experienced fund managers and, additionally, little evidence of 
short-term performance persistence.   
 
Porter and Trifts (2012) find even less encouraging results with regard to the performance of 
long-serving managers.  The researchers examine the performance 6,645 funds and 10,605 
managers from fund inception up until Dec 2008.  This sample included 289 managers of 355 
actively managed funds with at least a ten year tenure, having a mean tenure 14.5 years.  
They calculate risk-adjusted returns against the broadly diversified CRSP index, and also 
using the Carhart four-factor model.  Using this extensive dataset, they find an inverse 
relationship between tenure and performance, that is, a decline in performance as managers 
become more experienced.  They also find evidence to suggest that managers earn their 
reputations by outperforming early on in their careers thus helping to extend those careers 
despite less than impressive subsequent performance.  In a more recent paper, and using a 
similarly extensive database, Porter and Trifts (2014) also found no evidence of performance 
persistence amongst long-serving managers and instead came to the conclusion that the key 
to a successful career in fund management had much more to do with avoiding 
underperformance rather than generating outperformance.  Thus they find evidence in support 
of the fund manager strategy of “benchmark hugging”. 
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: in section 2 we present the data; in Section 3 
we discuss the results of preliminary analysis of the data; we present the results of tests of 
performance persistence and of regression analysis in Section 4; while we close the paper 
with a summary in Section 5.    
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2. Data  
To investigate the performance and characteristics of long-serving fund managers the 
research began by identifying all of those US active managers of US equity portfolios 
contained in the Morningstar database that had a tenure in excess of ten years as at December 
2014, and that are the named, single manager of the fund.  The related funds managed by 
these managers were also identified.  Using this information, which comprised 357 unique 
manager/fund observations in total, we then constructed the base data set that consisted of: 
performance-related fund data along with other information about the funds; and a second set 
of data that was focussed on the fund manager and their characteristics.  Although the 
Morningstar database has a fairly comprehensive set of biographies for managers, from 
which important features of the manager’s background can be abstracted, some biographies 
were either missing, or embodied relatively little detail.  In those instances where key details 
on the manager’s gender and educational background were missing, a web-based search was 
conducted using the manager’s name and fund manager’s employer.  In all cases it was 
possible to find the missing details using this technique. 
 
2.1 Manager level data 
Using a combination of the text-based Morningstar manager biographies and the biographical 
information garnered from the web, it was possible to build a database comprising each 
manager’s gender and educational background.  The database contains information on the 
manager’s undergraduate degree type – BA or BS; the manager’s undergraduate major – for 
example, Economics, Finance, etc; which university the manager attended; whether the 
manager held a Master’s degree, an MBA or a PhD; whether the manager is CFA3 qualified; 
                                                          
3
Shulka and Singh (1994) examine the impact on fund performance of having at least one manager of a fund as 
a CFA holder.  Although they find evidence of superior performance from those funds where a CFA holder 
plays a part in managing the portfolio, the results are difficult to interpret because they cannot separate the 
impact of the others managing the fund.  In our paper we focus on funds managed by a single named manager. 
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and the manager’s gender; and finally the manager’s tenure as at December 2014.  Although 
this is a rich database, unfortunately it was not possible to find a reliable source to identify 
the ages of the managers.   
 
2.2 Fund level data 
For each of the 357 funds in the sample we collected the end month net of fee, total returns 
for that fund from January 2005 to December 2014.  To calculate the total return on a fund in 
each month, Morningstar takes the change in the net asset value (NAV) of the month, 
reinvesting all income and capital gains distributions over the course of the month, and then 
divides this by the fund’s NAV at the start of the month.  The total returns are net of 
management, administrative, 12b-1 fees and other costs.  For each fund we also collected: 
monthly information on fund assets; data on the total assets of the fund management group; 
data on the number of holdings in each fund; the fund’s management fee as a % of AUM; and 
the fee income generated by each fund. 
 
Using the monthly returns on each fund we calculate risk-adjusted performance by 
subtracting the monthly return on the fund’s stated ‘primary’ benchmark using Morningstar.  
Given that the performance-related element of a fund manager’s remuneration is nearly 
always based upon the performance of their fund relative to the performance of their fund’s 
stated benchmark, this is arguably the most appropriate way of risk-adjusting the manager’s 
performance.  Other researchers, including Angelidis et al (2013), Cremers et al (2012) and 
Agyei-Ampomah et al (2015) all argue that it is more appropriate to use the financial market 
benchmark against which the manager is judged as a way of risk-adjusting returns.  Indeed, 
these authors argue that it is inappropriate to judge managers using factor models, where 
these factors are essentially arbitrage portfolios that, when we take account of shorting 
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restrictions, transactions costs and in particular the costs associated with shorting even very 
large stocks, are uninvestible.  These factor models are still valuable in understanding 
performance, but as benchmarks they cannot be replicated and do not represent the 
opportunity sets available to fund managers.   
 
3. Data analysis  
3.1 Manager characteristics 
Table 1 presents the set of manager characteristics.  The first row of Panel A in this table 
shows that the average manager tenure of this set of managers are 16 years, the shortest 
tenure is ten years – by construction.  These are all certainly experienced fund managers.  
This row in the table also shows that just over 7% of the managers are female (a figure 
similar to that identified by other researchers that have sought to identify a relationship 
between gender and fund performance); 86.5% of the managers hold a BA undergraduate 
degree while 21.6% hold a BS – indicating that a small number have both a BA and BS.  
These long-serving managers studied a fairly diverse range of undergraduate subjects, 
however, 36.6% of the sample had a degree in either Economics or Finance.  In a similar 
vein, the universities attended by the sample was fairly diverse and were largely US 
universities.  However, given the status of the Ivy League universities in the US educational 
system (and because previous researchers have focussed on this aspect of manager 
educational background) we identified all those managers in the sample that had attended an 
Ivy League University.  This group of managers made up 12.7% of the sample population.  
With regard to postgraduate education, while just over one in five of the managers hold a 
Masters’ degree, two in five are MBA qualified, only 1.73% of the sample have a PhD.  
Finally, 41.8% of the sample held the CFA charter, essentially the industry standard 
qualification for asset management and analysis. 
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In section 4 we will use these characteristics to try and understand their impact on fund 
performance, and so for completeness the other rows in the table give the breakdown of 
manager characteristics for subsets of the managers.  The second row in the table presents 
this break down for female fund managers.  For example, the women managers in this sample 
have been manging their funds for an average of 14.8 years, and 52% of them hold the CFA 
charter, the highest proportion amongst any of the other sub-groups of manager.  The table 
also shows that nearly 39% of MBA holders are also CFA holders. 
 
3.2 Fund characteristics 
Panel A of Table 2 presents some descriptive information about the funds managed by the 
long-serving managers.  The arithmetic average fund size is just over $2.2bn, however the 
median fund size is $938m indicating that there are a small number of very large funds in this 
sample.  Similarly, the arithmetic mean group assets is just under $145bn, while the median is 
$44bn.  However, there is less variation when it comes to average holdings.  The arithmetic 
average fund holdings is 78 stocks, compared with a median of 76.  This fund characteristic 
indicates that the managers are far from being benchmark huggers given the number of stocks 
in the typical benchmarks, with the most common one being the S&P 500 Composite Index.  
Finally, the last two rows in Panel B of the table present information about the management 
fee as a percentage of AUM and in annual dollar terms.  The average fixed fee is 0.75%, 
giving an arithmetic average annual income of just over $23m and a median of $9.6m per 
annum. 
 
Panels B to I of Table 2 present the same statistics for subsets of the full sample.  Each of 
these panels also offers additional information regarding the significance of any difference 
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between that sub-sample and the full sample.  Column 2 presents the average difference 
between the full sample and the sub-sample; while column 3 presents a t-statistic for the 
significance of this difference.  On the whole column 3 finds little significant variation in the 
characteristics – most of the t-values indicate that we should accept the null that there is no 
difference between the respective samples at conventional levels of statistical confidence.  
The main exception relates to the average number of stocks in the funds.  On average, female 
fund managers, those educated at an Ivy League University, those that have an MBA and the 
sub-sample consisting of those with a CFA affiliation each manage portfolios with 
significantly higher stocks than the full sample comparator.  Those with a BS, on average, 
manage portfolios with fewer stocks a result that the t-value of -2.41 indicates that the result 
is statistically significantly different.   
 
3.3 Fund manager performance 
Table 3 presents some basic information about the raw monthly fund returns and monthly 
returns in excess of the fund benchmark.  Again Panel A presents the results for the full 
sample, while panels B to I present sub-sample results with differences in mean values along 
with a test for the significance of these mean differences.   
 
Panel A shows that the average monthly net of fee return on the funds over this sample period 
was 0.79%, but that the net of fee return in excess of the benchmark averaged 0.04%, a figure 
that annualises to just under 0.50%pa.  Compared with other studies in this area, this excess 
benchmark figure is high: almost 50bps a year, net of fees for ten years in excess of the 
benchmark.  The benchmark-adjusted performance figures look impressive for this sample of 
managers, but of course there is an element of survivorship bias here.  Presumably managers 
with a good track record are more likely to stay in their role than those with a poor one.  
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However, this average outperformance does not appear to be well defined given the relatively 
high standard deviation of these excess returns across managers.  Furthermore, the final 
column in Table 3 reports the proportion of managers that have outperformed their 
benchmarks over the ten year period.  We find that just over 60% of the managers outperform 
their benchmarks on a net of fee basis.  Nevertheless, this figure suggests that choosing a 
manager with at least a ten year track record may be one way of identifying a manager that 
may perform well in the future.  
 
The remaining panels in Table 3 show remarkably little variation in benchmark-adjusted 
performance across the different sub-samples.  Perhaps the only exception to this uniformity 
is seen in Panel B where we find that the benchmark-adjusted performance for female 
managers averages -0.03% per month, or around -0.36%pa over the ten year sample period.  
The last column in Panel B shows that only 36% of female managers managed to outperform 
their benchmarks over this period.  This average underperformance is however not found to 
be statistically significant. 
 
3.3 Value and small cap exposures 
In the regression analysis that we present in section 4.2 below we include the value and small 
cap coefficients generated from the Fama and French three factor model (see Fama and 
French, 1992, 1993).  For each fund, over the full ten year period, we estimate the following 
familiar expression using OLS: 
 
                                      (1) 
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where     is the return on fund i at time t;     represents the risk free rate, proxied by the 
monthly return on a 1 month US T-Bill; ERM, HML and SMB are the components of the 
three factor model, collected from the Kenneth French
4
 website;    is a constant;   ,    and 
   are OLS coefficients that capture the relationship between the return on fund i in excess of 
the risk free rate; and     is a white noise error term.  Estimating this expression for each fund 
gives 357 estimates of the three betas, one set for each fund.  We use the estimates of    and 
   in the regression analysis. 
 
4. Results  
Despite the caveats, most notably that of survivorship bias, Table 3 appears to suggest that 
fund managers with at least ten years of experience might be able to generate positive, 
benchmark-adjusted returns for investors over time.  In this section of the paper we delve a 
little deeper into the performance of these long-serving managers by undertaking some tests 
of performance persistence and also using regression analysis to try and identify the 
characteristics of successful long serving managers. 
 
4.1 Performance persistence 
To investigate the performance of these managers further we look at performance on an 
annual basis over the sample period and conduct some simple performance persistence 
experiments, using the benchmark-adjusted fund returns.   
 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the average monthly, benchmark-adjusted returns for the 
managers for each year in the sample period, broken down into performance deciles.  The 
annual benchmark-adjusted performance of each decile are also presented in this table.  The 
                                                          
4
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top decile of funds produced benchmark-adjusted returns that ranged from 0.72% to 2.15% 
per month, while for the bottom decile of performers the range was -0.60% to -1.65%.  The 
figures in bold in the table indicate where these benchmark-adjusted returns are significantly 
different from zero at at least the 95% level of confidence.  Unsurprisingly, given the 
selection criteria, most of these decile returns, over most years, are highly significant.  The 
penultimate row in Panel A labelled “1 minus 10” reports the difference between the average 
monthly benchmark adjusted returns produced by the top-performing decile of funds and the 
bottom-performing decile of funds for each year.  This difference ranges from 1.32% to 
3.71%.  This is an enormous difference when annualised.   
 
The last row in Panel A presents the average monthly returns, in excess of the benchmark on 
an annual basis.  Recall that the average over the full ten years was 0.04% per month.  This 
average is negative for six of the ten years in this sample, and perhaps more interestingly was 
negative over the last four years, essentially the post crisis period.   
 
There is evidence then, that this the collective ability of these managers to outperform their 
benchmarks waned over this ten year period.  It is possible that as these managers matured 
further that their appetite for risk declined, hence explaining the decline in benchmark-
adjusted performance.  To investigate this possibility we calculated the tracking error of each 
manager for every year in the sample.  Figure 1 presents the average annual manager tracking 
errors.  There is no obvious trend in average tracking error, although manager tracking error 
does rise during the crisis period, making it difficult to conclude that manager risk appetite 
declined over this period.  Another explanation might relate to ‘style drift’ over this period.  
To investigate this possibility we estimated the FF three factor model, for each fund for each 
year in the sample.  Figures 2A and 2B present the average SMB and HML coefficients 
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respectively on an annual basis.  The evidence in Figure 2A suggests no obvious trend in 
average exposure to small cap relative to large cap stocks.  However, Figure 2B does show a 
more pronounced trend with regard to average exposure to the high book-to-mark-value 
relative to low book-to-mark-value risk factor.  There seems to have been an increasing 
exposure to “growth risk” at the expense of “value risk” over this period, and it is possible 
that this change drove the decline in average benchmark-adjusted performance.   
 
Panel A of Table 4 does indicate that each year there was a set of managers that managed to 
produce high benchmark-adjusted returns.  Panel B essentially presents a test of the 
hypothesis that investors can identify these high performing managers by observing their 
performance in year t, and investing with them over year t+1.  In other words, the panel 
presents tests of manager performance persistence.  The first column in Panel B of Table 4 
shows the average benchmark-adjusted returns over 2006 for those funds sorted into their 
performance deciles based on their performance in 2005.  The second column presents 
analogous results for 2007 where funds were sorted into deciles based upon their 
performance in 2006, and so on.  The values in the first row of Panel B present the average 
benchmark-adjusted returns achieved by funds that were top decile performers in the previous 
year: in six of the nine years these averages are estimated to be negative, suggesting an 
absence of positive performance persistence.  When we consider the performance of those 
funds that were in the bottom decile of performers in the previous year, we find positive 
alphas in seven of the nine years.  Furthermore, none of these averages were found to be 
statistically significant at even the 90% level of confidence.  The values in the row entitled 
“one minus ten” are much smaller than equivalent values in Panel A of the Table.  Overall 
then, these results suggest little evidence of annual performance persistence.  The final row of 
Panel B, which presents the correlation of fund returns from one year to the next, confirms 
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the lack of persistency amongst manager’ returns over this period.  These correlations range 
from 52% to -54%; for seven of the nine pairs of years the correlation coefficient is negative. 
 
Taken together these results show first, that the performance of this set of managers 
deteriorated over the ten year sample period and that although their average performance over 
the ten year period was relatively good, from year to year there was little evidence of 
performance persistence.   
 
4.2 Regression analysis 
Having tested for performance persistence amongst this group of managers, we now take a 
more disaggregated approach to analysing the performance.  More specifically, we use OLS 
regression techniques to try and establish whether the performance of the managers is related 
to either their personal or fund characteristics.  To do this we estimate the following 
expression: 
 
  ̃     ∑      
 
             (2) 
 
where   ̃ is the average monthly return over the ten year sample period on fund i in excess of 
the fund’s benchmark;     is manager i’s kth fund and personal ‘characteristic’;    is an OLS 
coefficient which captures the sensitivity of average benchmark-adjusted performance with 
the kth manager characteristic;   is a constant; and    is on OLS error term.  We include the 
following continuous variables:  the average holdings in the manager’s portfolio (Avehold); 
the annual fund fee (Fee); the natural logarithm of the fund’s AUM (LAUM) and the natural 
logarithm of the fund management groups’ assets (LGROUP); the manager’s tenure in excess 
of ten years (tenure); and the fund’s value and size betas,    and   , from expression 1, we 
denote these generated variables as HML and SMB respectively in the results for clarity.  We 
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also, include a set of dummy variables to capture manager characteristics.  The variable F 
takes the value 1 if the manager is a female, zero otherwise; the variable Ecofin takes the 
value 1 if the manager has studied either finance or economics as an undergraduate, zero 
otherwise; the variables BS and BA take the values of 1 if the manager’s Bachelor’s degree is 
a BS or a BA respectively, zero otherwise; the variable Ivy takes the value 1 if the manager 
has studied at an Ivy league university, zero otherwise; the variable MBA takes the value 1 if 
the manager has an MBA, zero otherwise; and finally the variable CFA takes the value 1 if 
the manager holds the CFA charter, zero otherwise.   
 
Table 5 presents the results of estimating expression (2).  We find a negative relation between 
benchmark-adjusted, net of fee returns and both average holdings (Avehold) and fund fees 
(Fee).  The t-statistics for these two variables indicate that these relationships are highly 
significant.  The results suggest that investors should, other things equal, pick funds where 
the manager holds fewer stocks on average and charges a lower fund fee.   The coefficients 
on fund and group size (LAUM and LGROUP) are also found to be significant at 
conventional levels of confidence.  However, the signs of the coefficients are different.  We 
find a positive relationship between excess returns and fund size, but a negative relationship 
between excess returns and the size of group assets.  This result may have implications for 
the “family fund” literature which seeks to establish whether there is a relationship between 
the status of a fund as part of the fund, or family group.  Our result here suggests that larger 
funds in smaller fund groups tend to outperform smaller funds in larger fund groups.  The 
coefficient on the variable Tenure is found to be negative, that is, as the tenure of the 
manager increases performance in excess of the benchmark declines.  However, since the 
sample only includes those managers that have been in place for at least ten years it is not 
surprising that this variable is found to be insignificantly different from zero.  Essentially 
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there is little cross-sectional variation in this variable.  The coefficients on the two measure of 
manager style, HML and SMB, are both found to be significant.  However, the coefficients 
have opposite signs.  The coefficient on the measure of value bias, HML, indicates that this 
bias tended to subtract from performance against their benchmarks.  By contrast, we find that 
those managers with a small cap bias in their portfolios, gauged by the SMB coefficient, 
tended to outperform their benchmarks. 
 
Table 5 also presents the coefficients on the manager characteristics.  The only dummy 
variable found to be statistically different from zero is the marker for gender.  We find that 
the female managers in this group tended to underperform relative to their male peers.  
Although the remaining coefficients are not found to be statistically significant, one could be: 
65% sure that having a degree in economics or finance might enhance returns; and 67.5% 
certain that a Bachelor of Science would enhance returns. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the performance of US mutual fund industry’s longest 
serving equity fund managers.  As a group this set of managers produced a relatively 
impressive performance in excess of fees and their benchmarks of around 0.40% pa for ten 
years.  This is relatively high compared with the findings of other studies, which often 
document negative values for average alphas (see for example Agyei-Ampomah et al (2015)) 
who use comparable benchmark-adjusted approach over a similar sample period).  However, 
when we delve deeper into the performance of these long-serving fund managers we find a 
deterioration of excess performance over time and, in addition, little evidence to suggest that 
performance persists from one year to the next.  However, for those investors that would still 
prefer to invest with an experienced fund manager than with an inexperienced one, our 
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disaggregated OLS analysis shows that there are certain traits to look out for in an 
experienced fund manager.  In particular we find that funds with: lower fees; that are 
comprised of fewer holdings; that are large relative to the size of the fund management 
company; that have a positive bias towards small stocks and a negative bias towards value 
stocks; and that are managed by a male fund manager – have tended to produce higher risk-
adjusted returns over time. 
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Table 1: Manager Characteristics 
This Table presents the set of manager characteristics, based on a sample of 357 managers with at least a ten-
year, track record as the manager of a single fund of US equities, identified using the Morningstar database.  
Tenure indicates the tenure of the manager (in years); female indicates the gender of the manager; BA and BS 
represent Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Science respectively; Eco/Fin indicates that the manager’s 
undergraduate degree was either in Economics of Finance; Ivy indicates whether the manager went to an Ivy 
League University; Masters, MBA and PhD indicates that the manager has a Masters’ degree, and MBA or PhD 
respectively; and CFA indicates whether the manager is a CFA charter holder. 
 
 
Tenure 
(yrs) Female BA BS Eco/Fin Ivy Masters MBA PhD CFA 
Full 16.3 7.2% 86.5% 21.6% 36.6% 12.7% 20.2% 41.8% 1.7% 41.8% 
           Female 14.8 100.0% 88.0% 16.0% 20.0% 24.0% 40.0% 40.0% 4.0% 52.0% 
BA 16.3 7.3% 100.0% 19.0% 37.0% 14.0% 20.7% 48.3% 1.3% 37.0% 
BS 15.0 5.3% 76.0% 100.0% 40.0% 9.3% 25.3% 52.0% 4.0% 46.7% 
Eco/Fin 16.4 3.9% 87.4% 23.6% 100.0% 15.0% 26.8% 48.8% 2.4% 47.2% 
Ivy 16.3 13.6% 95.5% 15.9% 43.2% 100.0% 6.8% 72.7% 4.5% 36.4% 
Masters 16.2 14.3% 88.6% 27.1% 48.6% 4.3% 100.0% 28.6% 1.4% 44.3% 
MBA 15.8 6.9% 100.0% 26.9% 42.8% 22.1% 13.8% 100.0% 1.4% 38.6% 
PhD 18.18 14.3% 71.4% 42.9% 42.9% 42.9% 14.3% 28.6% 100.0% 28.6% 
CFA 15.9 9.0% 76.6% 24.1% 41.4% 11.0% 21.4% 38.6% 1.4% 100.0% 
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Table 2: Fund Characteristics 
This Table presents the fund characteristics of the 357 funds managed by managers with at least a ten-year, track 
record as the manager of a single fund of US equities, identified using the Morningstar database.  Each panel 
presents descriptive statistics on: fund assets; group assets; the number of fund holdings; fund management fee 
as a proportion of AUM; and total fee income.  These statistics are presented for each of the manager 
characteristics identified in Table 1 (with the exception of PhD), where: Female indicates the gender of the 
manager; BA and BS represent Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Science respectively; Eco/Fin indicates that 
the manager’s undergraduate degree was either in Economics of Finance; Ivy indicates whether the manager 
went to an Ivy League University; Masters and MBA PhD indicates that the manager has a Masters’ degree or 
MBA respectively; and CFA indicates whether the manager is a CFA charter holder.  The column headed t-stat 
presents a t-statistic for a test of the difference between the sub-sample fund characteristic (Panels B to I) and 
the mean value presented in Panel A for the full sample.   
 
  Mean 
Mean 
Diff t-stat Median St. Dev Max Min 
A. Full               
Fund Assets ($mns) 2268 -  938 4631 48867 78 
Group Assets ($mns) 144992 -  44434 278603 1564176 209 
# of holdings 78 -  76 31 150 21 
Man Fee (% AUM) 0.01 -  0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 
Fee income ($mns) 23.04 -  9.58 39.15 306.65 0.73 
B. Female               
Fund Assets ($mns) 1444 -824  820 2194 11281 173 
Group Assets ($mns) 105097 -39895  61163 131764 577205 4035 
# of holdings 91 13 11.51 83 28 147 45 
Man Fee (% AUM) 0.74% -0.01% -0.001 0.75% 0.16% 1.15% 0.40% 
Fee income ($mns) 16.22 -6.82 
 
9.06 20.75 98.37 1.63 
C. BA 
       Fund Assets ($mns) 2404 136  989 4911 48867 78 
Group Assets ($mns) 136809 -8183  53222 255298 1564176 209 
# of holdings 78 0 0.31 76 31 150 21 
Man Fee (% AUM) 0.75% 0.00% 0.01 0.75% 0.21% 1.75% 0.30% 
Fee income ($mns) 24.47 1.42 
 
9.86 41.33 306.65 0.73 
D. BS 
       Fund Assets ($mns) 1,733 -535  1,181 1,979 12,809 130 
Group Assets ($mns) 194,616 49,623  83,439 326,162 1,521,943 362 
# of holdings 76 -2 -2.41 73 31 150 22 
Man Fee (% AUM) 0.74% -0.01% -0.02 0.71% 0.20% 1.50% 0.35% 
Fee income ($mns) 22.39 -0.65 
 
9.90 31.83 173.54 1.38 
E. Eco/Fin 
       Fund Assets ($mns) 2175 -93  902 3968 35269 78 
Group Assets ($mns) 133954 -11039  58646 235110 1521943 519 
# of holdings 77 -1 -1.4 73 31 150 22 
Man Fee (% AUM) 0.79% 0.04% 0.01 0.75% 0.22% 1.75% 0.31% 
Fee income ($mns) 24.39 1.35 
 
9.87 39.75 305.54 0.95 
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Table 2: Continued 
This Table presents the fund characteristics of the 357 funds managed by managers with at least a ten-year, track 
record as the manager of a single fund of US equities, identified using the Morningstar database.  Each panel 
presents descriptive statistics on: fund assets; group assets; the number of fund holdings; fund management fee 
as a proportion of AUM; and total fee income.  These statistics are presented for each of the manager 
characteristics identified in Table 1 (with the exception of PhD), where: Female indicates the gender of the 
manager; BA and BS represent Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of Science respectively; Eco/Fin indicates that 
the manager’s undergraduate degree was either in Economics of Finance; Ivy indicates whether the manager 
went to an Ivy League University; Masters and MBA PhD indicates that the manager has a Masters’ degree or 
MBA respectively; and CFA indicates whether the manager is a CFA charter holder.  The column headed t-stat 
presents a t-statistic for a test of the difference between the sub-sample fund characteristic (Panels B to I) and 
the mean value presented in Panel A for the full sample. 
 
  Mean 
Mean 
Diff t-stat Median St. Dev Max Min 
F. Ivy League        
Fund Assets ($mns) 2358 90  1440 3297 17741 97 
Group Assets ($mns) 94006 -50986  82592 112594 577205 645 
# of holdings 89 11 11.31 93 34 147 22 
Man Fee (% AUM) 0.72% -0.03% -0.04 0.74% 0.18% 1.15% 0.33% 
Fee income ($mns) 23.78 0.74  13.87 32.18 144.06 1.47 
G. Masters        
Fund Assets ($mns) 1771 -497  832 2237 11281 113 
Group Assets ($mns) 78753 -66240  32992 187263 1521943 256 
# of holdings 79 1 1.08 78 30 148 23 
Man Fee (% AUM) 0.78% 0.03% 0.05 0.75% 0.16% 1.15% 0.30% 
Fee income ($mns) 19.23 -3.81  7.97 24.65 98.37 0.73 
H. MBA        
Fund Assets ($mns) 2476 208  1038 5602 48867 78 
Group Assets ($mns) 133624 -11368  64519 239483 1521943 275 
# of holdings 80 2 3.73 75 32 150 21 
Man Fee (% AUM) 0.72% -0.03% -0.07 0.74% 0.18% 1.50% 0.31% 
Fee income ($mns) 23.63 0.59  9.37 42.02 305.54 0.95 
I. CFA        
Fund Assets ($mns) 2,182 -86  938 4,765 48,867 78 
Group Assets ($mns) 123,677 -21,316  44,070 224,654 1,521,943 256 
# of holdings 80 2 2.73 80 33 146 21 
Man Fee (% AUM) 0.76% 0.01% 0.02 0.75% 0.22% 1.75% 0.32% 
Fee income ($mns) 24.23 1.19  10.65 42.22 306.65 1.38 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for monthly raw and benchmark-adjusted returns 
This Table presents performance statistics of the 357 funds managed by managers with at least a ten-year, track 
record as the manager of a single fund of US equities, identified using the Morningstar database.  The returns 
are all net of fees.  Each panel presents descriptive statistics for raw monthly returns (Returns) and for returns in 
excess of each funds’ benchmark (Excess Returns), based on the manager characteristics presented in Table 1, 
where: Female indicates the gender of the manager; BA and BS represent Bachelor of Arts and Bachelor of 
Science respectively; Eco/Fin indicates that the manager’s undergraduate degree was either in Economics of 
Finance; Ivy indicates whether the manager went to an Ivy League University; Masters and MBA PhD indicates 
that the manager has a Masters’ degree or MBA respectively; and CFA indicates whether the manager is a CFA 
charter holder.  The column headed t-stat presents a t-statistic for a test of the difference between the return 
produced by the manager sub-samples (Panels A to I) and the return produced by the full sample (Panel A).   
 
  Mean 
Mean 
Diff t-stat Median St. Dev Max Min % +ve 
A. Full 
        Returns 0.79% 
  
0.80% 0.14% 1.35% 0.28% 
 Excess Returns  0.04%     0.04% 0.16% 0.65% -0.51% 60.5% 
B. Women 
        Returns 0.79% -0.01% -0.01 0.78% 0.18% 1.23% 0.39% 
 Excess Returns  -0.03% -0.08% -0.09 -0.02% 0.18% 0.35% -0.40% 36.0% 
C. BA 
        Returns 0.79% 0.00% -0.01 0.80% 0.14% 1.35% 0.28% 
 Excess Returns  0.04% 0.00% -0.02 0.03% 0.16% 0.65% -0.51% 59.0% 
D. BS 
        Returns 0.80% 0.00% 0.00 0.81% 0.14% 1.23% 0.52% 
 Excess Returns  0.04% 0.00% 0.01 0.03% 0.17% 0.35% -0.40% 61.3% 
E. Eco/Fin 
        Returns 0.78% -0.01% -0.03 0.81% 0.14% 1.04% 0.28% 
 Excess Returns  0.04% 0.00% 0.00 0.05% 0.15% 0.41% -0.51% 62.2% 
F. Ivy League 
        Returns 0.79% -0.01% -0.01 0.79% 0.13% 1.23% 0.48% 
 Excess Returns  0.04% -0.01% -0.01 0.02% 0.13% 0.31% -0.20% 54.6% 
G. Masters 
        Returns 0.79% -0.01% -0.01 0.79% 0.14% 1.05% 0.28% 
 Excess Returns  0.01% -0.03% -0.05 0.01% 0.16% 0.35% -0.51% 55.7% 
H. MBA 
        Returns 0.79% 0.00% -0.01 0.81% 0.14% 1.23% 0.28% 
 Excess Returns  0.05% 0.01% 0.02 0.04% 0.16% 0.41% -0.51% 62.1% 
I. CFA 
        Returns 0.8% 0.0% 0.05 0.8% 0.1% 1.2% 0.5% 
 Excess Returns  0.1% 0.0% 0.04 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% -0.3% 62.1% 
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Table 4: Persistence of benchmark-adjusted returns 
This Table presents average, net of fee returns for the 357 funds managed by managers with at least a ten-year, 
track record as the manager of a single fund of US equities, identified using the Morningstar database, where the 
sample has been split into ex post (Panel A) and ex ante (Panel B) performance deciles.  The row entitled “1 Yr 
Correl” presents the correlation coefficient of the performance of each fund in year t, with its performance in 
year t+1. 
        Panel A:  Average, benchmark-adjusted monthly returns, ex post decile ranking 
Years 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Decile           
1 1.08% 1.14% 2.15% 1.36% 2.13% 1.31% 1.07% 0.72% 1.20% 0.97% 
2 0.65% 0.44% 1.29% 0.81% 1.20% 0.76% 0.51% 0.24% 0.36% 0.31% 
3 0.47% 0.23% 0.87% 0.59% 0.85% 0.46% 0.29% 0.12% 0.21% 0.10% 
4 0.37% 0.08% 0.61% 0.30% 0.60% 0.24% 0.10% 0.05% 0.10% -0.01% 
5 0.26% -0.04% 0.39% 0.09% 0.38% 0.07% -0.03% -0.02% -0.02% -0.11% 
6 0.12% -0.15% 0.19% -0.09% 0.18% -0.08% -0.13% -0.09% -0.12% -0.21% 
7 0.01% -0.27% 0.00% -0.29% 0.02% -0.21% -0.27% -0.17% -0.25% -0.32% 
8 -0.10% -0.45% -0.21% -0.55% -0.14% -0.33% -0.40% -0.26% -0.38% -0.42% 
9 -0.27% -0.70% -0.58% -0.89% -0.47% -0.58% -0.58% -0.38% -0.60% -0.57% 
10 -1.20% -1.23% -1.57% -1.55% -0.99% -1.08% -1.13% -0.60% -1.65% -1.12% 
1 minus 10 2.28% 2.37% 3.71% 2.92% 3.12% 2.40% 2.20% 1.32% 2.85% 2.09% 
Average 0.14% -0.09% 0.31% -0.02% 0.38% 0.06% -0.06% -0.04% -0.12% -0.14% 
   
 
Panel B: Average, benchmark-adjusted monthly returns, ex ante decile ranking 
 Years   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Decile           
1 
 
0.09% -0.23% -0.68% -0.08% 0.76% 0.21% -0.15% 0.12% -0.58% 
2 
 
0.02% -0.13% -0.43% -0.05% 0.52% -0.28% -0.14% -0.02% -0.35% 
3 
 
-0.10% 0.00% -0.34% 0.16% 0.20% -0.18% -0.14% -0.28% -0.31% 
4 
 
-0.13% 0.14% 0.02% 0.19% 0.07% -0.12% -0.08% -0.27% -0.22% 
5 
 
-0.46% 0.18% 0.00% 0.28% -0.01% -0.19% -0.10% -0.03% -0.17% 
6 
 
-0.19% 0.27% 0.17% 0.41% 0.00% -0.09% -0.04% -0.26% -0.16% 
7 
 
-0.06% 0.34% 0.17% 0.44% -0.09% -0.01% 0.00% -0.11% 0.01% 
8 
 
-0.16% 0.59% 0.10% 0.68% -0.10% -0.14% -0.01% -0.04% 0.09% 
9 
 
-0.16% 0.68% 0.52% 0.51% -0.37% 0.19% -0.04% -0.02% -0.09% 
10 
 
0.21% 1.31% 0.25% 1.22% -0.42% 0.04% 0.31% -0.25% 0.39% 
1 minus 10   -0.12% -1.54% -0.92% -1.30% 1.18% 0.17% -0.46% 0.37% -0.98% 
1Yr Correl  -14.9% -45.3% -32.0% -44.4% 52.0% -2.2% -33.0% 10.2% -54.2% 
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Table 5: Modelling benchmark-adjusted performance 
This Table presents the results of OLS estimates of the following expression: 
  ̃     ∑     
 
   
    
where   ̃ is the average return on fund i in excess of the fund’s benchmark;     is manager i’s kth 
‘characteristic’;    is an OLS coefficient which captures the sensitivity of average benchmark-adjusted 
performance with the kth manager characteristic;   is a constant; and    is on OLS error term.  The following 
are continuous variables:  the average holdings in the manager’s portfolio, AVEHOLD; the annual fund fee, 
FEE; the natural logarithm of the fund’s AUM, LAUM and the natural logarithm of the fund management 
groups’ assets, LGROUP; the manager’s tenure in excess of ten years, TENURE; and the fund’s value and size 
betas HML and SMB estimated from expression 1 in the text.  The following variables are included as zero-one 
dummies: F takes the value 1 if the manager is a female, zero otherwise; the variable ECOFIN takes the value 1 
if the manager has studied either finance or economics as an undergraduate, zero otherwise; the variables BS and 
BA take the values of 1 if the manager’s Bachelor’s degree is a BS or a BA respectively, zero otherwise; the 
variable IVY takes the value 1 if the manager has studied at an Ivy League university, zero otherwise; the 
variable MBA takes the value 1 if the manager has an MBA, zero otherwise; and finally the variable CFA takes 
the value 1 if the manager holds the CFA charter, zero otherwise.  The coefficients t-stats and probability values 
in bold indicate that the variable is significant at at least the 90% level of confidence. 
 
Variable Coefficient t-stat Prob.   
C -0.0002 -0.33 74.2% 
AVEHOLD 0.0000 -3.44 0.1% 
FEE -0.1076 -2.70 0.7% 
LAUM 0.0001 2.06 4.0% 
LGROUP -0.0001 -1.62 10.0% 
TENURE 0.0000 -0.62 53.8% 
HML -0.0008 -2.12 3.5% 
SMB 0.0015 6.39 0.0% 
F -0.0008 -1.92 5.6% 
ECOFIN 0.0002 0.92 35.6% 
BS 0.0002 0.99 32.5% 
BA 0.0000 0.17 86.8% 
IVY -0.0001 -0.35 73.0% 
MBA 0.0001 0.30 76.6% 
CFA 0.0001 0.66 50.9% 
R-squared 14% Mean dependent var 0.04% 
Adjusted R-squared 11% S.D. dependent var 0.16% 
S.E. of regression 0.0015 Akaike info criterion -10.09 
Sum squared resid. 0.0008 Schwarz criterion -9.93 
Log likelihood 1832 Hannan-Quinn criterion -10.03 
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Figure 1 
This Figure presents the average, annual tracking error of the 357 funds managed by managers with at least a 
ten-year, track record as the manager of a single fund of US equities, identified using the Morningstar database.  
The returns needed to calculate this performance figure are all net of fees. 
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Figure 2A 
Figures 2A and 2B present the average SMB (2A) and HML (2B) coefficients estimated using the Fama-French 
three factor model, on an annual basis for the 357 funds managed by managers with at least a ten-year, track 
record as the manager of a single fund of US equities, identified using the Morningstar database.  The returns 
needed to calculate this performance figure are all net of fees. 
 
Figure 2B 
 
